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I. INTRODUCTION
The gavel bangs. All rise. It begins as any other criminal trial in Flor-
ida. The jury sits patiently as the judge informs them of the charges alleged
against the Defendant, and then the attorneys sweep the jurors away with
their opening arguments. Slowly, the facts begin to unfold. The jury learns
that on September 13, 2002, a woman from Lee County, Florida was brutally
raped in her own home while her children slept in the next room.' When she
takes the stand, she tells the jury that the Defendant broke into her home in
the dead of night on that September evening. 2 They listen raptly as she re-
counts her horrific experience. The Prosecutor, representing the State of
* Nicole Velasco received her B.A. from Florida State University and is a 2006 J.D.
Candidate at Nova Southeastern University. She would like first and foremost to thank the
Honorable Jeffrey R. Levenson of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Broward County Court,
for his inspiration. She would also like to thank her family and friends, especially senior staff
members Suzen Corrada and Mark Friedman, for their encouragement throughout the writing
of this article. She gives very special recognition to Adam Mayer for his love and unending
support.
1. Britt Dys, Rape Case Sparked the Bill, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, at 10.
2. Id.
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Florida, corroborates the victim's testimony by presenting DNA evidence
which irrefutably links the Defendant to the alleged crime.
When it is the Defendant's turn to take the stand, the jurors listen to his
claims that he formerly dated the victim.4 He argues that the sexual inter-
course with her was consensual, which is why his DNA was found at the
scene.5 However, this explanation quickly becomes unsatisfactory when the
prosecution calls its rebuttal witness: a police officer who testifies that the
time during which the Defendant alleges to have "dated" the victim, the De-
fendant was in jail.6 After the Defendant testifies, his attorney declines to
call any more witnesses.7
After both sides have presented all of the evidence, the defense makes
the first closing argument.8 The prosecution follows with its final attempt to
remove all reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt from the jurors' minds.9
The defense gets up once again, this time to rebut the State's argument and
impress the final words upon the jury. °
The jury deliberates for ninety minutes before returning from the jury
room.1" All rise again, this time anxiously awaiting the jury's decision as
they file into the jury box. The foreman hands the verdict to the bailiff. Si-
lence permeates the courtroom, and then a wave of shock and disbelief
washes over its occupants as the clerk announces a verdict of not guilty. 2
The scene you have just envisioned is not an imaginary one. It is a re-
cap of the true story of Christopher Hiatt's prosecution and subsequent ac-
quittal,'3 which disgusted one Florida legislator enough to try to change the
process of Florida criminal trials. 14 The proposed solution is articulated in
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Dys, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Dys, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. State v. Hiatt, No. 02-003394 CF (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct. 2003), at http://www.leeclerk.
org/crim detail.asp?CsNum=02003394CF&CsType = .
14. Dys, supra note 1. Representative Carol Green sponsored House Bill 1149. Id. In
the article, she stated that she "was so upset by what [she] watched happen" in the trial, and
that in her opinion, Hiatt lied in his testimony. Id. The prosecutor in the Hiatt case stated, "It
was hideous." Id.
[Vol. 29:1:99
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House Bill 1149,15 and has the power to snatch away defendants' present
advantage of having the last word in criminal trials. 6
The order of closing arguments in criminal proceedings is currently
governed by rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,17 or, as
most Floridian practitioners affectionately call it, the "sandwich rule." This
rule states that "a defendant offering no testimony in his or her own behalf,
except the defendant's own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument be-
fore the jury."18 As was the case in State v. Hiatt,19 defendants who present
nothing more than their own testimony at trial have the distinct advantage of
giving the first closing argument and the rebuttal argument at final summa-
tion, thereby sandwiching the prosecution's argument in between. The
courts of Florida have followed rule 3.250 without question for over 150
years.2 ° Consequently, for over a century and a half, the order of closing
arguments in Florida's criminal trials has hinged upon the defense's trial
strategy.
The proposal espoused by House Bill 1149 posed to end that tradition
by repealing rule 3.250 and enacting section 918.19 of the Florida Statutes.2'
Although ultimately the bill was not among those signed by the Governor,22
its proposition raises fascinating legal issues. A statute like proposed section
918.19 would entitle the prosecution to the first closing argument and the
rebuttal argument in all criminal trials, without giving any effect to the evi-
15. H.R. 1149, Fla. Leg., Reg. Sess. (2004), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
loadDoc.aspx?FileName= h 149_.doc&DocumentType=Bill&Number=I 149&Session=
2004 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
16. Id.
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250.
18. Id.
19. Hiatt, No. 02-003394 CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2003), at http://www.leeclerk.org/crim_
detail.asp?CsNum=02003394CF&CsType=.
20. Britt Dys & Jan Pudlow, Who Gets the Last Say? Bill Would Reverse the Order of
Closing Arguments, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, at 1. During the hundredth year of the rule's
enactment, the Supreme Court of Florida stated, "Never once... during the past one hundred
years has this court deviated from the proposition that the right given by the statute is a vested
procedural right which cannot be denied to a defendant when he is entitled to exercise it."
Faulk v. State, 104 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1958).
21. H.R. 1149.
22. H.R. 1149, Fla. Leg., Reg. Sess. (2004), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session
/index.cfm?Mode=Bills&SubMenu= 1&Tab=session&BIMode=ViewBillnfo&BillNum=
1149&Chamber =House&Year=2004&Title=%2D%3EBill%2520Info%3AH%25201149
%2D%3E Session%25202004 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). The bill died in committee on
April 30, 2004, after being introduced to the Florida Senate and referred to the Judiciary and
Criminal Justice Committees. H.R. 1149.
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dence the defense may or may not present.23 Thus, if and when the change
does pass into law, it will be the defense who perpetually gets "sandwiched."
The heated debates over whether to enact this new bill 24 begs the ques-
tion: is it the law and the facts upon which jurors base their verdicts, or is it
the closing arguments? Does having the last word determine whether justice
will be served? This article will explore the answers to these questions, as
well as which avenues should be taken to ensure that Florida's criminal jus-
tice system is one about seeking the truth.
Part II of this article discusses the purpose of the closing argument and
its impact on the criminal trial. Part III surveys the history of this facet of
Florida criminal procedure law, as well as how a change such as that pro-
posed by House Bill 1149 would affect criminal procedure in Florida. Part
IV analyzes the laws governing the forty-six other states that have already
implemented rules similar to proposed section 918.19 of the Florida Statutes,
while Part V examines the four states that have declined to follow the pro-
posed Florida rule. Part VI discusses the possible reaction of the Supreme
Court of Florida to such a rule. Finally, Part VII will conclude with a rec-
ommendation that Florida's legislators continue to seek the repeal of rule
3.250 to give prosecutors the statutory right to make the final argument in
criminal trials.
II. THE POWER OF THE LAST WORD
The power of the last word is one that most of us like to have when we
argue, and lawyers in particular have been known to suffer from "the last
word disease., 25 This power that lawyers crave usually takes shape in the
form of the closing argument, which is one of the most crucial elements of
the entire trial presentation.26 In fact, closing arguments are viewed by our
criminal justice system as so vital that they are recognized as fundamental to
the right to present a defense at trial. 7 In 1975, the United States Supreme
Court described the importance of the closing argument by stating, "[t]he
difference in any case between total denial of final argument and a concise
but persuasive summation could spell the difference, for the defendant, be-
23. H.R. 1149
24. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 1.
25. Jason Vail, To Reply or Not to Reply: When Having the Last Word Doesn't Cut It,
OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 2000, at 33.
26. Tucker Ronzetti & Janet L. Humphreys, Avoiding Pitfalls in Closing Arguments, FLA.
B.J., Dec. 2003, at 36.
27. Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Propriety of Trial Court Order Limiting Time for
Opening or Closing Argument in Criminal Case--State Cases, 71 A.L.R. 4th 200, 208-09
(1989) (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)).
[Vol. 29:1:99
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tween liberty and unjust imprisonment., 28 Undoubtedly, most criminal de-
fendants view the quality of their closing arguments as a factor upon which
their freedom depends.
The right to assistance of counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, 9 along with the Due Process Clause con-
tained within the Fourteenth Amendment,3" have been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court to mean that "there can be no restrictions upon
the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution., 31 Indeed, the
right to present a closing argument in a criminal trial is one that American
courts take very seriously,3 2 and failure to provide a defendant with the op-
portunity to exercise that right has been deemed reversible error by the high-
est court of this country.3 3 Even pro se defendants are entitled to present a
final summation at the close of evidence, 34 regardless of whether the case is
tried before a jury.35 This right has also been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, along with certain state courts, as deriving from the language
of the Sixth Amendment.36 It is worth mentioning that although it is not the
focus of this discussion, the right to final summation, though widely recog-
nized,37 can, like other substantive rights, be waived.38
Perhaps the magnitude of the closing argument is best understood in
light of its purpose. In a criminal trial, the closing argument is a mechanism
for sharpening and clarifying the issues upon which the trier of fact must
render judgment.3 9 It reinforces in the jurors' minds, in words and phrases
28. Herring, 422 U.S. at 863.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury .. .and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31. Herring, 422 U.S. at 857.
32. See, e.g., State v. Plaskonka, 577 A.2d 729, 731 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that
failure to give a defendant the opportunity to present a closing argument is grounds for a new
trial on appeal).
33. Herring, 422 U.S. at 865.
34. JACoB A. STEIN, CLOsING ARGUMENT § 3 (1996) (citing Herring, 422 U.S. at 864 n.
18; Holmes v. State, 637 A.2d 113, 116 (Md. 1994)).
35. Plaskonka, 577 A.2d at 731; Holmes, 637 A.2d at 116.
36. Holmes, 637 A.2d at 116.
37. Herring, 422 U.S. at 860.
38. 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 1773 (2001); STEIN, supra note 34, § 4.
39. STEIN, supra note 34, § 2 (citing Herring, 422 U.S. at 862).
2004]
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that make sense to them, a clear picture of what the evidence has already
painted."
The trial is like a jigsaw puzzle. It has a bunch of tiny little pieces
of evidence, all coming in at different times-and really meaning-
less to a jury. And when you put it together in the summation, it be-
comes a great big painting. A beautiful painting is what you want
them to see.41
Others describe the closing argument as a device through which to or-
ganize and highlight favorable evidence, rebut opposing arguments, explain
the applicable law, and show the jury that the evidence leads to a verdict in
favor of the arguing attorney.42 In other words, the goal is "to convince the
trier of fact that the advocate's view of the disputed issues is correct and that
it should render a verdict accordingly." '43
According to Texas, a state that has specifically defined the main pur-
pose of arguments to the jury, summations must assist in proper analysis of
the evidence so that the jury may reach a "just and reasonable conclusion
based on the evidence alone."'  The courts of Texas have also created a spe-
cific standard by which jury arguments are measured.45 The attorney's ar-
gument must fall into one of four general categories: 1) summation of the
evidence; 2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; 3) response to argu-
ment made by opposing counsel; or 4) pleas for law enforcement. 6
It is generally atypical for a court to create such methodological rules
with regard to final summation.4' During closing arguments, more than at
any other point in the trial, an attorney has the opportunity to truly become
an advocate for his or her client. 8 Thus, in the interest of encouraging advo-
cacy, courts generally allow attorneys a wide margin for error49 and liberal
40. STEIN, supra note 34, § 200.
41. BETTYRUTH WALTER, THE JURY SUMMATION AS SPEECH GENRE 40-41 (Jacob L. Mey
et al. eds., 1988) (quoting attorney Stanley E. Preiser's response to the question, "[W]hat is
the main thing you are trying to do during the summation?").
42. J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS 133 (Murray L. Schwartz et al. eds.,
1983).
43. H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TUL.
L. REv. 961,969 (2002).
44. Alex v. State, 930 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Dickinson v. State,
685 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
45. Alex, 930 S.W.2d at 791.
46. Id. (citing McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
47. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 554 (1991).
48. STEIN, supra note 34, § 1.
49. Id.
[Vol. 29:1:99
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freedom of speech" in the presentation of their arguments to the jury.5 It is
generally true, therefore, that the law governing closing arguments is without
specific rules and is noticeably less technical than other bodies of law.
2
However, not everyone agrees that permitting such freedom for the pur-
poses of promoting advocacy is a good idea. 3 One author, when comment-
ing on the negative effects of the adversarial system as it relates to the prac-
tice of criminal law, discussed the tactics and behavior some attorneys em-
ploy at trial. 4 The author specifically mentions that the tendency of trial
lawyers to "obscure the facts rather than illuminate them"55 and to "increase
prejudice rather than reduce it,"56 is due to the pressure attorneys feel to cre-
ate stronger cases. 7 "Each side, after all, is not fighting for the truth to
emerge; it is fighting to win."5" While presumably not all attorneys operate
under this mentality during the normal course of a trial, some do argue to win
during closing argument; and those who do not, nonetheless seek to be as
persuasive as possible when speaking their final words to the jury. 9
The significance of being the last to speak is so entrenched in American
culture that we associate the "last word" with an advantage to the person who
gets it.6" Lawyers and judges alike carry this association directly into the
legal world61 with regard to the order of closing arguments in criminal tri-
als.62 Judge Walden of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has stated, "[A]s
all acquainted with trial tactics know ... the right to address the jury finally
50. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 554 (1991) (citing Ga. Power Co. v. Walker, 114 S.E.2d 159,
161 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960); State v. Crisp, 94 S.E.2d 402, 406 (N.C. 1956); Johnson v. Life Ins.
Co. of Ga., 88 S.E.2d 260, 269 (S.C. 1955)).
51. STEIN, supra note 34, § 1.
52. Id.
53. LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 182 (Mary Dougherty et
al. eds., 5th ed. 2001).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. BAUM, supra note 53, at 182.
59. WALTER, supra note 41, at 41. Dr. Walter conducted extensive studies on jury sum-
mation, including its perceived importance in the words of attorneys. Id. When asked the
question, "What is the main thing you are trying to do during the summation?," the majority
(fifteen of the thirty-four attorneys questioned) responded that their goal is to persuade, while
only two replied that they attempt to win the case at summation. Id at 40-41.
60. John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L.
139, 145 (2000).
61. Id. at 149.
62. See Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1994) (Anstead, J., specially concurring);
Raysor v. State, 272 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
2004]
7
Velasco: Taking the "Sandwich" Off of the Menu: Should Florida Depart from
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
is a fundamental advantage which simply speaks for itself."63 "Under [our]
system, and in reality, it does matter who gets the last opportunity to address
the jury."'
The plethora of literature on the subject of how to argue more effec-
tively at final summation 65 suggests that attorneys believe that closing argu-
ments are powerful enough to persuade a jury to come to their conclusions,
even if the law or facts on their sides are slightly lacking.66 Indeed, some say
that in "close" cases, where neither the law nor the facts appear predomi-
nately one-sided, the persuasive talent of the lawyers, which will surface
mostly during opening and closing arguments, could possibly be the tie-
breaker.67 "The closing argument, no matter how strong, will seldom save a
botched trial, but where the issues are close and the decision is in doubt, an
effective final argument can be the difference between winning and losing.,
68
Such ideas are undoubtedly based on attorneys' beliefs that they possess con-
trol over the outcomes of the trials in which they argue, and that their skills
can positively impact their client's position.69 Studies show, however, that
this conception may be more than a belief.
70
63. Raysor, 272 So. 2d at 869.
64. Wike, 648 So. 2d at 688.
65. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 147 n. 16 (listing a sampling of the books that can be found
in one's law library on the subject of closing arguments).
66. See, e.g., Ray E. Moses, The Last Word, CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 55. The article
discusses how to "help jurors make correct choices," as well as how "to influence those
choices by what [we] say during the argument phase of the trial." Id.
67. Caldwell et al., supra note 43, at 969.
68. STERN,supra note 34, § 201.
69. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 148; WALTER, supra note 41, at 38-39. Dr. Walter ques-
tioned thirty-four attorneys in her study on jury summation. WALTER, supra note 41, at 38-
39. When asked, "What is the value of the summation to the trial process," seventy-six per-
cent responded that it is extremely important:
1. "If a case can still be won or lost at the summation stage, then it is clearly the most impor-
tant part of the trial." S. Gerald Litvin
2. "I regard the trial as only a device to enable you to sum up to a jury."
A. Charles Peruto
3. "I think it's probably the single most important factor that determines the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant. It's that important."
"To me the entire trial is a preface to a summation. It's all leading up to that. The lawyer
is gearing the whole trial to that hour he can stand up before the jury and GO! He can do his
thing." Eugene F. Toro
4. "I think it's probably the most important part of the trial because it's the only part of the
case that represents pure advocacy. It's the one time in a trial when almost without restraint a
lawyer can stand in front of a group of people and literally argue his case. It's the most per-
[Vol. 29:1:99
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The Department of Psychology at Yale University published a study on
opinion changes in individuals, including a section focused specifically on
the nature of persuasive communication as it relates to the forming and
changing of opinions.71 The authors made several observations regarding the
reactions of audiences to persuasive speeches, one of which appears to be
particularly true of juries during closing arguments :72
Shortly after being exposed to one communication, the audience is
likely to be exposed to additional communications presenting com-
pletely different points of view and designed to create completely
different opinions. Hence, the long-run effectiveness of a persua-
sive communication depends not only upon its success in inducing a
momentary shift in opinion but also upon the sustained resistance it
can create with respect to subsequent competing pressures. 73
suasive part of the case. He tries to explain away some of the calamities and exploit some of
the good fortune he's experienced."
"His summation ... brings to bear on the litigation all of the lawyer's skills: his imagina-
tion, his use of language .... "
"Those of us who defend criminal cases are concerned with that perhaps 20% in the mid-
dle where the lawyer's skill can make the difference. And in that category of cases, I think
the summation is probably the most influential part of the trial."
Herald Price Fahringer
5. "It's the most important thing I can contribute." Donald J. Goldberg
6. "I think proper summation can make a difference in a case that's not even close."
Raymond A. Brown
7. "From a defense lawyer's standpoint, it's the critical stage of the trial. Particularly in
fairly lengthy cases involving complicated factual patterns, where it's not going to be clear to
the jury what the case is really about until they hear it summarized and put together and related
to one theory or another. I think it's probably, from the defense standpoint, the single most
important phase of the trial." Thomas Colas Carroll
8. "It's priceless-if properly used. Communicating is the key point. By communicating
you persuade." John Rogers Carroll
9. "It's of real significant value primarily because you have an opportunity for the first
time-and actually for the last-to have direct contact with the jury." Joseph J. McGill
Id.
70. See generally CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953).
71. Id. at 6-11.
72. WALTER, supra note 41, at 18 (referring to HOVLAND ET AL., supra note 70, at 17).
73. HOVLAND ET AL., supra note 70, at 17.
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However, no subsequent competition exists for the attorney with the last
word in a jury trial, which may explain, at least in part, why the last word is
so coveted.
In an ideal criminal justice system, the party with the law and the facts
on his or her side would always win,74 regardless of who was the last to
speak to the jury. In reality, however, there are times when the party with
the law and the facts loses at trial.75 While such losses are exceptions and
may occur for any number of reasons, 76 some might blame the closing argu-
ments,7 probably even more so when they mirror the theatrical, persuasive
summations that are so often seen on television.7' Along with books and
film, television has had a significant impact on society's perception of the
legal system.79 Consistent with the media's portrayal is the picture of the
closing argument as "the great dramatic moment."" Trial attorneys who
understand that society expects this kind of drama at trial, perhaps in an at-
tempt to live up to the image, incorporate it intentionally into their closing
arguments.8
Jurors like to be entertained. 'OK, smart, big time, well paid law-
yer. Entertain us a little.' And they expect to hear just a tad of ora-
tory. To the extent that we all try to dress well, and not use bad lan-
guage before them, and try not to show our worst side to them, we
are catering to that fact.82
Attorneys have been fixated on the idea that closing arguments affect
jury verdicts for at least ninety years.83 In 1912, Yale Law Journal published
an article criticizing the new time constraints that the attorneys of that time
were beginning to face with regard to closing arguments.84 The author
blamed the "foolish verdict[s]" that often resulted on the brevity of these
74. Caldwell et al., supra note 43, at 969.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Dys, supra note 1, at 10. The article quotes Florida Representative Carole Green,
who, upon learning of the jury's not-guilty verdict in the Hiatt case, stated that the victim
"was victimized by what's happened in the court proceedings." Id.
78. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 149.
79. Id. Mr. Mitchell suggests in his article that perhaps this image persuades some law-
yers to join the legal profession in the first place. Id.
80. Id.
81. WALTER, supra note 41, at 42.
82. Id. (citing the response of a criminal defense attorney when asked, "What is the main
thing you are trying to do during the summation?").
83. John I. Williamson, The Disappearing Argument, 21 YALE L.J. 489 (1912).
84. Id.
[Vol. 29:1:99
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85
arguments, an accusation which contains an underlying message that clos-
ing arguments are crucial to the verdict-rendering process.
But perhaps to the dismay of some trial lawyers, at least one study has
revealed that closing arguments are irrelevant to the decision-making process
of jurors.8 6 The heads of this study labeled the "crucial importance" with
which attorneys regard the last word as merely "another myth lawyers hold
dear.,87  According to the authors of the study, closing arguments do not
even factor in to the jury's process of verdict rendition. 8 Not a single juror,
in over 2000 post-verdict interviews, attested to reaching a final decision
during or because of closing arguments.8 9 The authors found instead that
most jurors make up their minds during the trial itself, based on both testi-
monial and documentary evidence,9" while the rest of them decide during
deliberations with their peers in the jury room.9'
In a separate study conducted by Dr. Walter in which 214 jurors were
questioned on the importance of the final summation, eighty-eight percent
reported that they found the closing arguments to be important.92 However,
Dr. Walter conducted yet another study using different jurors, which re-
vealed that only six percent of those surveyed felt that the closing speeches
of the lawyers were important in reaching their decision in that particular
case.
93
85. Id.at491.
86. Howard Varinsky & Paulette Taylor, Trial Myths and Misconceptions, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Nov. 2003, at 26, 56. The authors state that the article was written, after two dec-
ades of speaking with jurors and conducting research to better understand jury behavior and
decision-making processes, with the goal of naming and dispelling age-old trial myths. Id. at
27.
87. Id. at 56.
88. Id.
89. Id. Even for those attorneys who believe that jurors expect to hear closing arguments
at trial, this information may not be surprising, as not all attorneys deem closing arguments to
be essential to the trial process. See WALTER, supra note 41, at 39. "Closing speeches don't
make a damn bit of difference. It's part of the show." Id. (quoting the response of a criminal
defense attorney when asked, "What is the value of the summation to the trial process?").
90. Note that this is entirely inconsistent with the instructions jurors receive which pro-
hibit them from forming decisions about the case until deliberations, when all of the evidence
has been presented. FLA. BAR, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §
2.1 (4th ed. 2002). However, as Herbert J. Stern says, "people are never impartial for any
longer than they have to be." HERBERT J. STERN, TRYING CASES TO WIN 115, 119 (1991).
91. Varinsky & Taylor, supra note 86, at 56.
92. WALTER, supra note 41, at 197. According to the study, the number one reason jurors
find the summation to be important is because it helps to refresh their memories. Id.
93. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 152 (referring to WALTER, supra note 41, at 205). Dr.
Walter mentions in her analysis of these results that the jurors were told, prior to deliberating
and filling out the questionnaires, to rely more on the law and the evidence than on the closing
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11
Velasco: Taking the "Sandwich" Off of the Menu: Should Florida Depart from
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
Despite these findings, jurors have been known to ignore irrefutable
physical evidence of guilt and acquit defendants who strongly appear to be
guilty of violent crimes.94 Psychological experts say that the reason for this
phenomenon is the use of certain implicit trial tactics by defense attorneys.95
If the defense attorney can engage the jurors in "absolutely essential psycho-
logical processes and addres[s] certain emotional issues" the attorney will
successfully sway the jury in his or her direction.96 One way that attorneys
do this is by creating a strong portrayal of the defendant as "psychologically
innocent" and as someone who is just like them.97 Or, if such a portrayal is
not likely to be convincing, the defense might play upon the jurors' emo-
tions9" by focusing on the defendant's tearful family.99 Often they will paint
a picture of the victim as the monster, as long as it is "someone or something
else other than the defendant against whom the jury can feel anger and to
whom they may apply punishment, so as to lend balance to their decision to
grant the perpetrator of a crime absolution, and thereby provide themselves
emotional equity."'00
Although experts attribute the success of attorneys who are able to win
this psychological game to clever selection of receptive jurors during voir
dire,' O' it is not illogical to conclude that closing statements must also be of
aid. Arguments are instruments of persuasion,'0 2 and a key element of per-
suasion is the recommended conclusion that is presented in the communica-
tion. 3 At closing arguments, the recommended conclusion is that the argu-
ing attorney is correct."° During that time, the attorney must "sell" his or her
case to the jury. 5 It is likely that sometimes this "sale" helps to convince
arguments of the attorneys. WALTER, supra note 41, at 205. In Dr. Walter's opinion, the
resulting data, indicating that only six percent felt closing arguments were important to their
decision-making process, was strongly influenced by the jurors not wanting anyone to think
that they disobeyed the instructions of the court. Id. at 205-06.
94. MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 9:1(b), at 836
(4th ed. 2003).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 9:1(b), at 837.
97. Id.
98. Id. However, it is generally thought to be improper for an attorney to appeal to the
sympathies of the jury. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 649 (1991).
99. BLINDER, supra note 94, § 9:1(b), at 837.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 9:1(b), at 839.
102. FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 493 (1949).
103. HOVLAND ET AL.,supra note 70, at 10.
104. Caldwell et al., supra note 43, at 969.
105. TANFORD, supra note 42, at 133.
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jurors to turn their backs on the evidence and focus on the defense attorney's
psychologically engaging portrayal of the defendant."6
The debate about whether jurors base their verdicts on the information
they hear at closing arguments, or on information that they receive during the
trial, is one of primacy versus recency. 1°7 Primacy and recency describe
trends that lawyers have always intuitively sensed, though perhaps without
complete understanding.'0 8 The term "primacy" refers to the notion that
what we hear first is significant, because it induces us to commit to certain
positions and lays a foundation for the information that follows.'09 The term
"recency" refers to the notion that what we hear last is most memorable, and
is therefore easier to recall and has the largest impact on our decisions." '
Whether jurors base any part of their verdicts on the statements made by
counsel during closing arguments is a debate that is not likely to cease.
However, if it is true that jurors make up their minds during the trial based
on the evidence," ' then changing rule 3.250 so that it entitles the prosecutor
to the first and final closing arguments, without giving any effect to the tes-
timony presented by the defense, would actually benefit the defendant.
Without the current version of rule 3.250, the defense would be free to pre-
sent as much testimony or other evidence as needed, thereby having a pre-
sumably significant impact on those jurors who make up their minds during
the trial based on the evidence presented to them. 12
Even if, on the other hand, jurors are swayed by the statements attor-
neys make, and closing arguments do factor into their decisions, a change in
rule 3.250 is warranted. 13 Given the susceptibility of jurors to sometimes
ignore the evidence before them,"4 the arguments in favor of giving the State
of Florida the final argument before the jury in all criminal trials are suffi-
ciently compelling, especially when coupled with the fact that the prosecu-
tion bears the heavy burden of proof.'s
106. BLINDER,supra note 94, § 9:1(b), at 837.
107. STERN, supra note 90, at 115.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Varinsky & Taylor, supra note 86, at 56.
112. Id.
113. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10. As Representative Carole Green stated, Florida
needs to "take some of the gamesmanship out of this process, and get truth back where it
needs to be." Id.
114. BLINDER, supra note 94, § 9: 1(b), at 836.
115. Faulk v. State, 104 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1958).
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III. THE BIRTH OF THE "SANDWICH" RULE
The "sandwich" rule has been an integral part of Florida jurisprudence
for more than 150 years."l 6  The concept of allowing the defendant in a
criminal trial to have the final word before the jury was originally codified in
chapter 539 of the Laws of Florida in 1853." 7 In its original form, the statute
provided that "in all cases wherein the defendant upon his trial introduces no
testimony, he shall, by himself or counsel, be entitled to the concluding ar-
gument before the jury,"" 8 which the Supreme Court of Florida unequivo-
cally ratified in 1858."9
It was not until 1911 that the legislature added the words "except his
own'12° to the statute to allow a defendant to testify in his or her own behalf
without losing the right of having the final say before the jury.'2 ' The devel-
opment of the rule finally culminated in 1939,122 and thus, the "sandwich"
rule as we currently know it was born.
A. The Common Law
At common law, the widely accepted rule in the United States'23 is that
the party with the burden of proof has the right to open and conclude the
final argument before the jury. 124 In criminal trials, that party is the prosecu-
tion, who has the great burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a
116. Id. (discussing the history of rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure).
117. Id.
118. Heffron v. State, 8 Fla. 73, 74-75 (Fla. 1858) (quoting Pamph. Laws of 1852-3, page
116).
119. See id.
120. Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521. Note that throughout this article, the defendant is often
referred to with masculine pronouns due to the language used by lawmakers of earlier times;
however, these laws and principles certainly apply to females as well.
121. Id.
122. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1994). The rule was ultimately codified as
section 918.09, Florida Statutes, which was repealed in 1970 after the adoption of rule 3.250
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1968. Id.
123. Not all countries agree with our common law. See generally Marilyn Vavra Kunkel
& Gilbert Geis, Order of Final Argument in Minnesota Criminal Trials, 42 MINN. L. REv. 549
(1958). The French, for example, have criticized the American criminal justice system be-
cause "we know of no such rule of fair play" as they do, namely that "[t]he accused is entitled
to the last word." Hon. Pierre Crabit~s, Why American Criminal Justice is a Failure, 23
A.B.A. J. 697, 700 (1937). Because our common law does not allow for such a rule, the
French say that we "have no conception of fair play to the accused," and that we have "the
souls and minds of hangmen." Id. at 700.
124. 75A AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 539 (1991); 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001).
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reasonable doubt." 5 Before 1853, this was the law in Florida,'26 and it con-
tinues to be the law in all but three other states. 27
The rationale behind the common law rule is that the party with the
burden of proof should be entitled to the opening and closing arguments to
the jury. 28 This structure for the order of closing arguments is grounded in
the premise that justice is best served if the defendant knows the actual ar-
guments that the prosecution will make in support of a conviction before the
defendant is faced with the decision whether to reply, and if so, what to re-
ply- 2
9
Perhaps another reason for the rule has to do with rules of psychol-
ogy. 3° The legal system has always understood the principles of primacy
and recency, which may be why the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions' give the party who carries the burden of proof the absolute right to
speak last.'32 Many psychologists agree that between primacy and recency,
recency is more powerful. 1'
Admittedly, if rule 3.250 was repealed so that it mirrors the common
law, the defense would never have the benefit of either primacy or recency at
closing argument. However, this seemingly unjust proposition is counter-
125. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7(c) (1999).
126. Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521. The common law theories governing closing arguments are
still the law in Florida for civil trials. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty, 313 So.
2d 649 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he right to open and close final
argument rests upon the general principle of law that the party on whom rests the burden of
proof is required to go forward with the evidence and ... is entitled to open and close.").
127. Only Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina operate under criminal procedure
laws like that of Florida, which allows the defendant in a criminal trial the last word before the
jury, if he or she offers no testimony. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (2003); N.C. GEN. R.
PRACT. SUPER. AND DIST. CTS. 10; State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v.
Crowe, 188 S.E.2d 379, 384 (S.C. 1972); State v. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 451 (S.C. 1802).
128. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001) (citing Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683,
686 (Fla. 1994)).
129. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 552 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1,
Notes of Advisory Comm.).
130. STERN, supra note 90, at 116.
131. Note that Florida, along with Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, is not
among the majority referred to.
132. STERN, supra note 90, at 116.
133. Id. Mr. Stem disagrees, and argues that it is most effective to begin strongly and
corroborate a powerful opening with evidence and testimony along the way. Id. at 117. He
suggests that being the first to speak at closing argument is beneficial, and advocates that the
method of beginning strongly should be applied throughout the trial. Id. In his opinion, what
the jurors hear first is most powerful. Id. This theory that primacy is more powerful than
recency may support the old saying that you never get a second chance to make a first impres-
sion. See STERN, supra note 90, at 116.
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acted by the great burden of proof that is placed upon the prosecution. 34
Additionally, the state cannot appeal an acquittal,' while the defendant, if
convicted, has a constitutionally protected right to an appeal.'36 Repealing
rule 3.250 and returning to the principles embedded in the common law fa-
vors traditional notions of fairness.
37
B. Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
The portion of rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
relevant to this discussion provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the
accused may choose to be sworn as a witness in the accused's own behalf
and ... a defendant offering no testimony in his or her own behalf, except
the defendant's own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the
jury."'138 To properly understand the application of this rule, one must first
know what constitutes testimony. Various appellate courts of Florida, in-
cluding the supreme court, have established that testimony includes docu-
ments,39 diagrams,"4 a sketch or drawing of the premises upon which the
alleged crime took place, 14 1 a video tape viewed by the jury, 142 and still pho-
tographs. 143 Indeed, rule 3.250 applies to documentary evidence.'
44
134. 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001); 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 539 (2004); 5
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 552; STEIN, supra note 34, § 5; STERN, supra note
90, at 116.
135. Balikes v. Speleos, 173 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (citing FLA.
STAT. § 924.07(1)).
136. Harriel v. State, 710 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 4(b)).
137. United States v. 2,353.28 Acres of Land, 414 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating
that allowing the party with the burden of proof to proceed first and last at final argument
favors traditional notions of fairness).
138. FLA. R. CRJM. P. 3.250.
139. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1778 (2004) (citing Paulk v. State, 405 So. 2d 785,
786 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
140. Grimsley v. State, 304 So. 2d 493,494 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
141. Barkley v. State, 10 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1942).
142. Scott v. State, 559 So. 2d 269, 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1778 (2004) (citing Kennedy v. State, 83 So. 2d 4, 5
(Fla. 1955); Talley v. State, 36 So. 2d 201, 205 (Fla. 1948)). However, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal recently held that still photos taken from a video entered into evidence by the
state, which was not a motion-picture video but a compilation of still frames, does not consti-
tute evidence on behalf of the defense separate from that offered by the state. Zackery v.
State, 849 So. 2d 343, 345-46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). If, however, the defense had
made the still photographs from a motion-picture video offered into evidence by the state,
those photographs would have constituted evidence, and therefore the defendant would have
forgone his right to conclude the argument to the jury, as the photographs would have been
additional to that which the state used to prove its case. Id. at 345.
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Consequently, to secure the rebuttal argument at closing under rule
3.250, a defense attorney may forgo presentation not only of relevant or even
significant testimony, but of nearly all documentary evidence as well. 145 For
example, in Williams v. State,146 the defendant's attorney failed to call wit-
nesses of whose existence the attorney knew, and who would have corrobo-
rated the defendant's story. 147 On appeal, the court found that such a failure
on the part of defense counsel was committed intentionally and solely for the
purpose of reserving the rebuttal at closing argument in accordance with rule
3.250.148 The court held that Mr. Williams had been convicted at trial of rape
and kidnapping as a consequence of his attorney's ineffective assistance, and
stated that it would have made a difference to Mr. Williams' case had his
attorney called the relevant witnesses to testify on his behalf. 149 Accordingly,
the court held that Mr. Williams did not receive a fair trial and reversed for a
new trial.150
Situations like this one provide opponents of rule 3.250 with ammuni-
tion. Not surprisingly, those in favor of repealing rule 3.250 argue that it
allows, and on some level may even encourage, defense attorneys to employ
tactical procedures at trial.' As the Williams case illustrates, such tactics
can include refusing to call witnesses on behalf of the defendant, even if
those witnesses' testimony could mean the difference between liberty and
imprisonment,' for fear of losing the sandwich against the prosecution at
closing argument.153
This reluctance to give up rebuttal arguments in criminal trials is
unlikely to subside. Perhaps one reason for opposition to a new rule is the
principle embedded so deeply in American society that a criminal defendant
is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that it is better to lose scores of
guilty convictions than to wrongfully convict one innocent person. 54 As
John Adams once said,
144. Id. at 344.
145. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
146. 507 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
147. Id. at 1123-24.
148. Id. at 1123.
149. Id. at 1124.
150. Id. at 1125.
151. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 1. "What this [bill] is about is truly seeking truth
and truly making decisions not based on gamesmanship." Id.; see Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
152. Williams, 507 So. 2d at 1124.
153. Id. at 1123.
154. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 549.
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We are to look upon it as more beneficial that many guilty persons
should escape unpunished than one innocent should suffer. The
reason is because it is of more importance to the community that
innocence should be protected than it is that guilt should be pun-
ished, for guilt and crimes are so frequent in the world that all of
them cannot be punished, and many times they happen in such a
manner that it is not of much consequence to the public whether
they are punished or not. But when innocence itself is brought to
the bar and condemned, especially to die, the subject or victim will
exclaim, "it is immaterial to me whether I behave well or ill, for
virtue itself is no security." And if such a sentiment as this should
take place in the mind of the subject there would be an end to all
security whatsoever. 155
Indeed, attorneys opposed to the change in the law base their opposition
in part on the theory that allowing prosecutors to have the last word will re-
sult in wrongful convictions. 15 6 However, one might conclude that guaran-
teeing prosecutors the rebuttal in all criminal trials would have entirely the
opposite effect, given the propensity of defense attorneys to omit potentially
significant evidence for the tactical sake of having the final word before the
jury. 157 Without the pressure weighing upon their shoulders to reserve the
rebuttal argument at closing, defense attorneys can devote true zeal to the
representation of their clients by presenting as much defensive evidence as
may be appropriate for the particular case.
The Third District Court of Appeal recently addressed this issue in Diaz
v. State.5 ' At trial, the court encountered a rule 3.250 problem that arose due
to an issue with the scope of cross-examination of a particular witness."
The court had placed certain restrictions upon cross-examination, 6 ° relying
on the premise set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida that "the defendant
may not use cross-examination as a vehicle for presenting defensive evi-
155. STEIN,supra note 34, § 553.
156. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10. The article quotes Tallahassee criminal defense
attorney Tim Jansen, who warned that if the bill becomes law, "[y]ou may see more convic-
tions where the evidence does not rise to beyond reasonable doubt." Id.
157. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026; Williams, 507 So. 2d at 1123.
158. 747 So. 2d 1021, 1021 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1023. The court relied on Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1982), in
which the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the proper purposes of cross examination: "(1)
to weaken, test, or demonstrate the impossibility of the testimony of the witness on direct
examination and, (2) to impeach the credibility of the witness .... Therefore it is held that
questions on cross-examination must either relate to credibility or be germane to the matters
brought out on direct examination." Id. at 337.
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dence."' 16' Defense counsel was therefore unable to question one of the
state's witnesses regarding a fact pertinent to establishing his client's defense
of self-defense, as the court deemed it outside the scope of cross-
examination. 162 Consequently, defense counsel had to "make the witness his
own,"' 163 thereby losing the advantageous "sandwich" at closing argument. 164
The defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder. 165
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal expressed its agreement
with the trial court by stating, with distinct annoyance, that "but for the exis-
tence of rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure the scope of
cross-examination issue presented in this case would not exist," and that
"[t]he truth finding process was not compromised."' 166 In the court's learned
opinion, rule 3.250 as currently written discourages criminal defendants from
presenting evidence that could potentially benefit their clients, because de-
fense attorneys feel as if they must pay a price to present such evidence. 67
Although a criminal defense attorney may not withhold evidence which
directly exculpates his client of the crime charged for the sake of addressing
the jury last in closing argument, the same cannot be said of other types of
important evidence which may not be per se exculpatory, but are significant
to a secondary, but nevertheless important issue.168
Before introducing such evidence counsel is forced to weigh what is
to be gained by the introduction of that evidence against the loss of
the final argument. All too often, defense attorneys believe that their
oratorical persuasive abilities in final argument can better serve their
clients and the balance is erroneously stricken in favor of closing ar-
gument. 169
Additionally, the court pointed out that rule 3.250 promotes "less than
ethical behavior in the courtroom."' 7 ° Defense attorneys are prone to pro-
duce exhibits with which to question witnesses on cross-examination and to
parade before the jury, but then refuse to enter those exhibits into evidence
for fear of losing the right to "sandwich" the prosecution with two closing
161. Id.
162. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1024.
163. Id. at 1023 (quoting Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 337).
164. Id. at 1023.
165. Id. at 1022.
166. Id. at 1025.
167. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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arguments. 71 Each of these problems can easily be eliminated by changing
rule 3.250 so that the state has the first and final closing arguments in all
criminal trials. 172
C. The Guilt Phase Versus the Penalty Phase
It is important to understand that the procedures used during the guilt
and penalty phases of a criminal prosecution in Florida are governed by
separate rules. 7 3 Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs closing arguments during the guilt phase.'74 The guilt phase is the
part of a criminal trial during which the jury, or in the case of a bench trial,
the judge, determines whether the defendant is guilty of committing a
crime.'75 By contrast, during the penalty phase, which is also known as the
sentencing phase, the finder of fact determines the punishment for a defen-
dant who has already been found guilty.'76 Perhaps the distinction is most
simply understood as the difference between "did he commit murder?" and
"should he die for committing murder?"'77
In capital cases, the order of closing arguments during the penalty phase
is governed by rule 3.780 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides that both the state and the defense will be given an equal opportu-
nity to present one final statement, and the state shall proceed first. 7 8 Under
rule 3.780, a trial judge has no discretion to change the order of final argu-
ments during the penalty phase; it is mandatory that the defendant address
the jury last.179 "[A] defendant always presents the final closing argument in
the sentencing phase."'
' 80
The "sandwich" rule has no bearing on the penalty phase of a criminal
trial,' 8' and therefore repealing rule 3.250 will not have any adverse effects
on the rights of a defendant in a capital sentencing hearing.
171. Id.
172. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
173. See 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1772 (2001).
174. Id. § 1777; FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.250.
175. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (8th ed. 2004).
176. Id. at 1169.
177. Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21,28 (1997).
178. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.780(c).
179. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1772 (2001).
180. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1994).
181. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1772 (2001).
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D. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
In the federal system, the order of closing arguments is as follows: the
prosecution opens the argument, the defendant is then given an opportunity
to reply, and then the prosecution is allowed to reply in rebuttal.'82 This
structure is set forth in rule 29.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.'83 To preserve fairness, the government's rebuttal is limited to issues
raised by the defendant in his or her argument."
As with the common law, the order of closing arguments in federal tri-
als favors the party bearing the burden of proof.'85 The Fifth Circuit has held
that because an order that permits the prosecution to proceed first and last
during final jury summation mirrors the burden of proof, it is improper for a
defendant to argue that allowing the prosecution to do so is unfair.'86 Ac-
cordingly, state statutes that imitate the federal system with regard to the
order of closing arguments have been upheld against due process chal-
lenges. 8 7 In fact, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutional-
ity of rule 3.250 when applied "against" the defendant in Preston v. State.
188
At trial, Mr. Preston called two witnesses to testify on his behalf, and
was thus not entitled to "sandwich" the prosecution with two closing argu-
ments.'89 On appeal, he raised three issues: 1) that the rule violated due
process by having a "chilling effect" on a defendant's right to call witnesses,
because if a defendant does call witnesses, he relinquishes his right to the
first and final arguments at closing; 2) that the rule denies defendants the
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as it discriminates procedurally against those who
do call witnesses; and 3) that allowing the prosecution to have the final ar-
gument has the psychological effect of diluting the defendant's presumption
of innocence, thereby violating due process. 90
With regard to the defendant's first argument, the court was disinclined
to agree that rule 3.250 produces a "chilling effect" on the defendant's right
182. 5 LAFAVEETAL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 552 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1).
183. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1.
184. 4 LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 29.13
(Mark S. Rhodes, ed., 2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2003) (citing United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d
755, 765 (11th Cir. 1984)).
185. Id. at 553 (citing United States v. Braziel, 609 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1980)).
186. Braziel, 609 F.2d at 237.
187. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 553 (citing Preston v. State, 260 So. 2d
501, 502 (Fla. 1972)).
188. 260 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1972).
189. Id. at 503.
190. Id.
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to call witnesses, as the decision to call witnesses is a basic choice that every
defendant must make if his counsel agrees that it is strategically desirable.1 91
To the defendant's second argument about unequal protection of the laws,
the court responded that the accusation is based on the premise that all de-
fendants are similarly situated, which is not at all true. 192 To the contrary,
when the situation arises in which the defense may call witnesses to build
"its own case for innocence," the defense receives "a more balanced expo-
sure before the jury."' 93 As for the defendant's third issue, the court stated
simply that the right to open and close the argument to the jury at final sum-
mation, while substantial, has never been raised to constitutional status and
the court was not about to raise it then.' 94 Instead, the court highlighted the
fact that under the common law and under statutes in the vast majority of
states, the right to open and close the final arguments belongs to the prosecu-
tion, who bears the great burden of proof.'95
After reading the opinion in Preston, one might conclude that the Su-
preme Court of Florida supports a rule that allows the prosecution to address
the jury last, given the fine arguments the court makes in support of the
structure of summations employed by so many other states.196 Indeed, the
prevailing view throughout the nation with respect to the order of closing
arguments in criminal trials emulates the view adopted by the federal sys-
tem.'97 Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina are the only
four out of our fifty states that have not embraced this structure.'98
191. Id. at 504.
192. Id.
193. Preston, 260 So. 2d at 504.
194. Id. at 504-05.
195. Id. at 505.
196. Id. at 504-05.
197. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c) at 552.
198. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (2003); N.C. GEN. R. PRACT.
SuP. AND DIST. CTS. 10; State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v. Crowe,
188 S.E.2d 379, 384 (S.C. 1972); State v. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 451 (S.C. 1802); Dys &
Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10 (mentioning that forty-six other states in the United States em-
ploy procedural rules that grant the prosecution the right to the first and final arguments at
closing in criminal trials).
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IV. THOSE FORTY-SIX OTHER STATES
Although the majority 99 of the United States employs an order for clos-
ing arguments that favors traditional notions of fairness, 20 not all forty-six
of those rules were originally enacted that way. For example, California's
statute governing the order of closing arguments in criminal trials initially
made the prosecution's opportunity to conclude the argument before the jury
merely discretionary,2°" thereby leaving room for the possibility that the de-
fendant could conclude. However, in 1873, only one year after its enact-
ment, the legislature amended the section giving the prosecution the absolute
right to rebut the defendant's closing statement.2 2 The order of closing ar-
guments in California has since remained the same.203
The history of the order of closing arguments in Minnesota presents a
particularly fascinating story. At one time, Minnesota had the unique dis-
tinction of being the only state in the entire country to always give the defen-
dant in criminal trials the concluding argument at final summation. 2°, The
proposition was introduced in 1875 as section 631.07 of the Minnesota Stat-
utes205 and, despite frequent agitation for change,20 6 was not amended until
112 years later.207
199. In most states, the order of closing arguments is either identical to that used by the
federal system, or else provides that each side will have the opportunity to speak only once,
with the defense being the first to proceed. Examples of the former structure include: Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-88 (West 2004); California, CAL. PENAL CODE §
1093(e) (West 2004); and Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-123 (Michie 2003). Arkansas,
however, includes a clause in its statute that requires both parties to state openly and fully
their basis for arguing that a certain verdict applies. Id. If a party refuses, the party "so refus-
ing" will be denied the conclusion of the argument. Id. New York is an example of the latter
type of statute. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 260.30 (McKinney 2004). Texas simply requires
that the prosecution proceed last, and leaves the specifics to the discretion of the trial judge.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 36.07 (Vernon 1981).
200. United States v. 2,353.38 Acres of Land, 414 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating
that allowing the party with the burden of proof to proceed first and last at final argument
favors traditional notions of fairness).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093 (2004) (Historical and Statutory notes). As enacted in
1872, the pertinent subsection read: "When the evidence is concluded.., the District Attorney
or other counsel for the people must open and the District Attorney may conclude the argu-
ment." Id. (emphasis added).
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(e) (2004).
203. Id.
204. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 550.
205. Id.
206. Id. The article cites and discusses a Minnesota Crime Commission report from 1927,
which was one of several attempts made to change the law. Id.
207. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.07 (West 2002) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
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During the time that section 631.07 governed in its pre-amended form,
researchers conducted a survey of the attorneys in Minnesota, inviting each
attorney in the state's eighty-seven counties to respond to a questionnaire.2 °s
Upon analyzing the results, the researchers noted that:
The most persuasive contention of [the] prosecutors is that defense
counsel may wander far afield in his final argument, including ir-
relevant, often prejudicial material, and possibly misleading com-
ments on fact or law. Defense counsel may interject any number
of theories on the evidence that the prosecution cannot annswer
[sic]. One respondent concluded that ". . . this statute ... enables
the defense to throw out a last-minute red herring." The state's
remedy is limited to corrective instruction by the presiding judge
and the unwise tactic of objecting during defense counsel's argu-
ment.209
The researchers further found that "the rights of the accused in a crimi-
nal trial are thought to be adequately protected by constitutional safeguards
without the additional advantage of having the final argument before the
jury," which was one reason those in opposition of the Minnesota statute
advocated its amendment.2 0 The study also revealed some attorneys' beliefs
that section 631.07 led to fewer convictions. 21  Those attorneys grounded
their belief in the notion that a typical jury is "highly vulnerable to strong
arguments by counsel, 212 and that when the factors and merits of the case
appear to be equal,213 the order of closing arguments could be the deciding
factor.214
On the other hand, some of the prosecutors who responded felt that al-
lowing the defendant to have the final word balances the equities, because
prosecutors are privileged with unconstrained financial resources for investi-
gation, more advanced investigative facilities, and cooperation from state and
208. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 551. One hundred twenty-eight attorneys replied.
Id.
209. Id. at 552.
210. Id. at 553.
211. Id. at 555.
212. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 555. However, the authors of the article noted that
psychological studies (conducted during that time) on the importance of the argument pro-
duced inconclusive findings. Id.
213. Id. The heads of the study commented on this statement, saying that if the factors
and merits of the case appear to be equal, then the state has established no more than an equal
case, and has therefore not met its burden of proof. Id.
214. Id. at 555.
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federal agencies.1 5 One attorney went so far as to say that if the state's evi-
dence is sufficiently compelling in and of itself, then their case should be
able to withstand the defense's closing argument.216
Clearly, the struggle to change the law in Minnesota was an uphill
climb.2"7 Ultimately, however, perseverance prevailed, and the statute was
amended in 1987.8 It now reads:
when the giving of evidence is concluded in a criminal trial... the
prosecution may make a closing argument to the jury. The defense
may then make its closing argument to the jury. The prosecution
shall then have the right to reply in rebuttal to the closing argu-
ment of the defense.
219
The result of this 112-year-old battle surely provides optimism for those
who wish to change the laws in the misfit states.
V. FOUR BLACK SHEEP
Each of the four misfit states have similar rules with regard to the order
of final arguments that give the defendant an opportunity to close before the
jury.220 None of these rules grants the criminal defendant an absolute right to
the last word, as section 631.07 of the Minnesota Statutes did in its pre-
amended form. Instead, each of the four states makes the defendant's right
to close contingent upon the defendant's refusal or failure to present evi-
dence at trial in defense of the charge alleged against him or her.22'
South Carolina was the first of the misfit states to adopt such a rule.22
The Supreme Court of South Carolina made its departure from traditional
laws in 1802 with its decision in State v. Brisbane.223 On an appeal, defense
counsel raised the issue of changing the order of closing arguments for the
215. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 554.
216. Id.
217. See id. According to a news article published by the Star Tribune in 1999, the strug-
gle is far from over. Id.; see Paul Gustafson, Criminal Prosecutors Want Last Word, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 20, 1999, at IB, available at 1999 WL 7493933.
218. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.07 (West 2002) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
219. § 631.07.
220. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. R. PRACT.
Sup. AND DIST. CTS. 10; State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v. Crowe,
188 S.E.2d 379, 384 (S.C. 1972); State v. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 451 (S.C. 1802).
221. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; § 17-8-71; N.C. GEN. R. PRACT. SUP. AND DIST. CTS. 10; Mou-
zon, 485 S.E.2d at 918; Crowe, 188 S.E.2d at 379; Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. at 451.
222. See Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. at 451.
223. Id.
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sole purpose of having "the point settled as a rule [there]after. ' '224 He swayed
the court by stating that allowing the prosecution to open and close the ar-
guments before the jury at final summation was a relict of English rule, and
that our country would be better served by a law "more agreeable to the
rights of freemen. '225
At that time, the order of closing arguments in civil trials in South Caro-
lina provided a defendant who called no witnesses in his or her defense with
the privilege of the last word.226 Defense counsel convinced the Brisbane
court that the rule would serve an even stronger purpose in criminal trials
because much more is at stake in a criminal trial. 227 Thus, the rule became
one of standing practice in South Carolina's criminal justice system.2 8
It seems clear from the Brisbane case that the court's motivation in im-
plementing the rule was to create a more just system for those defendants
who opt not to present a defense at trial; not, as it seems today, to discourage
defendants from presenting a defense at trial. 229 But the practice of allowing
a criminal defendant, who presents no defensive evidence or testimony, to
speak to the jury last continues to be upheld by the courts of modern-day
South Carolina.230 One cannot help but wonder whether such support for the
rule is based on belief in its validity, or on the typical reluctance of a society
to change the way things have been done for over 200 years.
In North Carolina, like in Florida, the order of closing arguments is gov-
emed by rule as opposed to common law or statute.231 It provides that in
both civil and criminal cases, if the defendant introduces no evidence, the
right to open and close the argument to the jury "shall belong to him. ' 232 The
practice of allowing this order for closing arguments in North Carolina dates
back to at least the mid- 1800's.233 Today, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
224. Id. at 453.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. at 453.
228. Id. at 454.
229. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Judge Sorondo
made this observation in Diaz with regard to this structure of closing arguments. See id.
230. State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v. Crowe, 188 S.E.2d 379,
384 (S.C. 1972).
231. See N.C. GEN. R. PRACT. SUP. AND DIST. CTS. 10. The order of closing arguments in
the penalty phase of a North Carolina trial is governed by statute, and provides that the defen-
dant shall have the right to the final argument. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2003).
232. N.C. GEN. R. PRACT. SUP. AND DIST. CTS. 10.
233. State v. Anderson, 7 S.E. 678, 680 (N.C. 1888). In State v. Anderson, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina briefly acknowledged the right of a defendant presenting no evidence
in his behalf to conclude the argument before the jury, indicating that by 1888, the rule was
common knowledge. Id.
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lina continues to protect the right of a defendant who presents no evidence in
his defense at trial to address the jury finally, by holding that it is not a right
of which the defendant can be deprived by an exercise of judicial discre-
234tion.
Additionally, by statute in North Carolina, up to three attorneys may ar-
gue to the jury on behalf of the defendant. 235 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has set forth the rule that in capital cases, although the maximum
number of attorneys per side that may argue to the jury is three, each attorney
may address the jury as many times as they wish during closing.236
Thus, for example if one defense attorney grows weary of arguing,
he may allow another defense attorney to address the jury and
may, upon being refreshed, rise again to make another address dur-
ing the defendant's time for argument. However, if the defendant
presents evidence, all such addresses must be made prior to the
prosecution's closing argument.237
Failure to allow each attorney to address the jury in this manner constitutes
prejudice to the defendant per se, and warrants a new trial.238 Clearly, a de-
fendant in North Carolina who presents no evidence with which to defend
himself at trial is entitled to great procedural advantages.
The purpose of Georgia's rule, according to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, is to allow counsel for an accused with no defense "every opportu-
nity to persuade the jury that the State has failed to prove his guilt. ' 23 9 Al-
lowing a defendant to open and conclude the argument under these circum-
stances has been common practice in Georgia since 1852.240 Lawmakers
created the law to make the order of closing arguments in criminal trials par-
allel to the order used in civil trials.241' Today, this aspect of Georgia's crimi-
nal procedure is controlled by section 17-8-71 of the Georgia Code.242
234. State v. Eury, 346 S.E.2d 447, 450 (N.C. 1986) (quoting State v. Raper, 166 S.E. 314
(N.C. 1932)).
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-97 (2003). The statute permits three attorneys per side to
address the jury. Id.
236. State v. Barrow, 517 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 365 S.E.2d 554,
559 (N.C. 1988); Eury, 346 S.E.2d at 450; State v. Gladden, 340 S.E.2d 673, 688 (N.C. 1986).
237. Gladden, 340 S.E.2d at 688 (explaining the court's interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-14, now § 7A-97, which grants this right).
238. Barrow, 517 S.E.2d at 377; Mitchell, 365 S.E.2d at 559.
239. Yeomans v. State, 192 S.E.2d 362, 365 (Ga. 1972).
240. Hargrove v. State, 45 S.E. 58 (Ga. 1903) (explaining the origin of Georgia's rule).
241. Id.; see Phelps v. Thurman, 74 Ga. 873 (1885); Chapman v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R.,
74 Ga. 547 (1885). These civil cases held that unless the defendant's plea was one of justifi-
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Although on its face, the statute does not explicitly state that a defen-
dant who offers only his own testimony at trial is entitled to the final closing
argument, the courts of Georgia have interpreted the law to mean just that."3
Unlike Florida, however, Georgia courts have held that a defendant who is
wrongfully denied the right to open and close the arguments to the jury, but
who, from the evidence, is clearly guilty of the crime alleged, is not entitled
to a new trial.2" In Florida, even in light of evidence indicating the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of Florida has
reversed convictions when the defendant has been wrongfully denied his
right to open and close the final arguments to the jury.245
The legislatures of Georgia and Florida appear to have been in synch
very recently, as the Georgia Senate attempted to change their statute
through the passage of Senate Bill 414.246 Much like Florida House Bill
1149, Georgia's bill posed to amend section 17-8-71 and repeal all laws con-
flicting with the statute as amended, so that "the prosecuting attorney shall
always conclude the argument to the jury. 247 Unfortunately, the fates of the
Georgia and Florida bills also appear to have been in synch, as neither Geor-
gia Senate Bill 414 nor Florida House Bill 1149 will become law in 2004.248
Thus, it is Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida which
comprise the four states that have perhaps become known as black sheep
among America's criminal justice system.
cation, the defendant was not entitled to the first and last arguments at final summation.
Phelps, 74 Ga. at 837; Chapman, 74 Ga. at 547-48.
242. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (2003).
243. Scott v. State, 253 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Ga. 1979).
244. Id. at 700.
245. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1994); Birge v. State, 92 So. 2d 819, 822
(Fla. 1957); 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1777 (2001).
246. S. 414, 2004 Gen. Assem., Leg. Sess. (Ga. 2004) available at http://www.legis.state.
ga.us/legis/2003_04/versions/sb4l4 As passedSenate_5.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
247. Id.
248. Georgia Senate Bill 414 was not among those signed by the Governor. The list of
those bills that were signed by the Governor after the 2003-2004 Session are available at the
Georgia General Assembly website. Ga. Gen. Assemb. available at http://www.legis
.state.ga.us/(last visited Oct.14, 2004). Florida House Bill 1149 died in committee on April
30, 2004, after being introduced to the Florida Senate and referred to the Judiciary and Crimi-
nal Justice Committees. For a complete history, visit the Florida Senate website. Fla. Sen.
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfn?Mode=Bills&SubMenu = 1 &Tab
=session&BI Mode=ViewBilllnfo&BillNum=1 149&Chamber=House&Year=2004&Title=%
2D%3EBill%2520Info%3AH%25201149%2D%3ESession%25202004 (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
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VI. WHAT WILL THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA SAY?
The Supreme Court of Florida enjoys the right, under article V, section
2(a) of the Constitution of Florida, to adopt rules for the practice and proce-
dure in all courts of Florida.249 Rules that are substantive in nature are left to
the legislature.25° Neither branch of the government may exercise a power
given to the other.2 1' Thus, the fate of the proposition espoused by House
Bill 1149 may ultimately depend upon whether the rule is deemed procedural
or substantive.252
The question, of course, is what makes a rule procedural as opposed to
substantive? The Supreme Court of Florida defines substantive law as it
relates to criminal law and procedure as "that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment therefor. '253 The court defined proce-
dural law in the same context as "that which provides or regulates the steps
by which one who violates a criminal statute is punished., 254 Put simply,
substantive law creates and defines rights, while procedural law is "legal
machinery '255 through which those rights are made effective.256
If rule 3.250 were ever to be repealed by a statute enacted by the legis-
lature, the issue will arise of how the Supreme Court of Florida will react. 57
Attorneys in opposition of the change argue that the rule is procedural, and
that the Supreme Court of Florida will find it unconstitutional.2 5 8 Not sur-
prisingly, advocates of the change argue that the rule is clearly substantive:
"[I]f you don't follow that rule... cases are reversed. And they are not sub-
ject to a harmless error analysis. That means it is a fundamental error. In
249. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
250. TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995); Benyard v. Wain-
wright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975).
251. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
252. STAFF ANALY. H.B. 1149 CRIM. PROSECUTIONS, H.R., 2004 Reg. Sess., at 4; see Dys
& Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10.
253. In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972) (quoting State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d
236, 238 (Fla. 1969)).
254. Fla. R. Crim. P., 272 So. 2d at 65 (quoting Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238).
255. Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238.
256. Id.; Benyard v. Wainright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975).
257. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10.
258. Id. An example of the supreme court's power occurred in 2000, when the court de-
clared the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000, passed by the legislature, an "unconstitutional
encroachment" on the court's "exclusive power to 'adopt rules for the practice and procedure
in all courts."' STAFF ANALY. H.B. 1149 CRiM. PROSECUTIONS, H.R., 2004 Reg. Sess., at 5
(citing Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 2000)).
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our view, that means it is a substantive right, which ... the legislature [has]
the total power to change. 259
Admittedly, the Supreme Court of Florida said that the right that is
granted to defendants in rule 3.250 is a "vested procedural right. 2 60 How-
ever, the court has also said that "[tihe fact that a statutory provision could
appropriately be labeled 'procedural' does not necessarily mean that it vio-
lates article V, section 2(a). 261 In fact, the court has refused to nullify pro-
cedural statutory provisions that are "intimately related to" or "intertwined
with" statutory provisions that are substantive in nature.262 With specific
regard to laws that combine substantive and procedural provisions, the Su-
preme Court of Florida has stated that the judiciary and legislature must
work together to give effect to such laws without encroaching on each
other's constitutional power.263 It is certainly arguable that rule 3.250, even
if considered procedural, also involves substantive law, given the fact that
failure to follow rule 3.250 is reversible error2" and can result in the reversal
of convictions even when the court acknowledges overwhelming evidence of
guilt. 265 In this respect, the Supreme Court of Florida actually appears to
harbor some resentment toward the "sandwich" rule, which is apparent from
the court's words in Birge v. State266 when forced to reverse the conviction of
a heinous crime: "It is not our privilege to disregard it even though we as
individuals might feel that [a defendant] is as guilty as sin itself. 267
Furthermore, the rule was originally enacted by the Florida Legislature,
not the Supreme Court of Florida, in 1853.268 When the supreme court rati-
fied the rule in 1858,269 and again in 1958,270 it stated that the rule is a "posi-
tive clear-cut unequivocal legislative enactment and we are bound to follow
it until the Legislature in its wisdom sees fit to change it."'271 If the legisla-
259. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10 (citing Brad Thomas, public safety policy direc-
tor for Governor Jeb Bush). Mr. Thomas also mentioned when interviewed for the article that
the Governor supports the proposition contained in House Bill 1149. Id.
260. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 1994); Faulk v. State, 104 So. 2d 519, 521
(Fla. 1958); Birge v. State, 92 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1957) (emphasis added).
261. In re Commitment: Cartwright, 870 So. 2d 152, 158 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
262. Id. (citing Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 54 (Fla. 2000)).
263. Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).
264. Wike, 648 So. 2d at 686; Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521; Birge, 92 So. 2d at 822.
265. Wike, 648 So. 2d at 686; Birge, 92 So. 2d at 822.
266. 92 So. 2d at 819.
267. Id. at 822.
268. Heffron v. State, 8 Fla. 73 (1858).
269. Id.
270. Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
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ture now sees fit to change the law, as House Bill 1149 indicates, then it
seems appropriate that the supreme court shall stay true to its word.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that the party with
the burden of proof shall proceed first and last during the final arguments of
a trial.272 It seems unreasonable that in a country which has adopted this pro-
cedure in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, Florida seeks to remain
behind. Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, as currently
written, discourages defendants from presenting evidence in their defense,
273
increases the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel, 274 and promotes un-
ethical behavior in the courtroom. 275 Whether a bill like House Bill 1149
ultimately becomes law and changes the order of closing arguments in crimi-
nal trials in Florida, the problem is unlikely to disappear. Like the prosecu-
tors of Minnesota, who faced a similar struggle years ago, the prosecutors of
Florida should not give up on this issue.276
A rule that began perhaps as a protective measure for defendants who
fail to defend themselves during their own criminal prosecutions,277 has
evolved into a mechanism for snatching away from the prosecution what the
common law clearly dictates belongs to them.27' Florida should take the ad-
vice of its learned Third District Court of Appeal and change rule 3.250, so
that we can "enhance the search for the truth and eliminate the misguided
notion that having the final argument in summation is more important than
the introduction of potentially important evidence.2 79
272. 75A AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 539 (1991 & Supp. 2004).
273. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
274. Williams v. State, 507 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); 14 FLA. JUR.
2D Criminal Law § 473 (2001).
275. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
276. Gustafson, supra note 217 (reporting that prosecutors vowed to keep pushing for a
change in the order of closing arguments until successful).
277. Preston v. State, 260 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 1972) (stating that the rule, as the Supreme
Court of Florida sees it, is "intended as an aid to those defendants entitled to avail themselves
of it, rather than as a limitation upon those desiring to call defense witnesses.") (emphasis
added). It is clear, however, that what the court intends the rule to be, and how defendants
actually view it, are separate and distinct. See id.
278. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001).
279. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
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